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Did the North American Free Trade Agreement make 
Mexican firms more productive? If so, through which 
channels? This paper addresses these questions by 
deploying an innovative microeconometric approach 
that disentangles the various channels through which 
integration with the global markets (via international 
trade) can affect firm-level productivity. The results 
show that the North American Free Trade Agreement 
stimulated the productivity of Mexican plants via: (1) an 
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on access to imported intermediate inputs. However, 
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In the past two or three decades most Latin American countries have redeﬁned their
development strategies, moving away from import-substitution regimes towards poli-
cies promoting integration with the global economy through exports and foreign direct
investments (FDI). This important shift has been accompanied by an intense academic
debate regarding the relationship between integration with the international markets
and domestic growth. Despite the general presumption of a positive impact of trade
liberalization on economic growth, there is still disagreement among economists about
the nature of this relationship (Baldwin 2000). Most of the controversy is explained
by the diﬃculty in identifying the underlying mechanisms driving this relationship
(Winters 2004). Furthermore, since trade liberalization is often just one element of a
more comprehensive set of market-oriented reforms it is hard to disentangle its eﬀect
from the impact of other policies.
This paper contributes to this debate by developing an innovative microeconometric
approach that can disentangle the various channels through which integration with the
global markets –via international trade– can aﬀect ﬁrm-level productivity. Our em-
pirical analysis is based on Mexican ﬁrm-level data covering 1993-2002, 1 a period of
economic integration between Mexico, the US, and Canada within the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The present study, deﬁnes NAFTA as a process of
economic integration that goes beyond a simple tariﬀ-reduction scheme and, instead,
encompasses a set of institutional rules within which foreign trade and investment take
place. The objective of this paper is to measure the impact of NAFTA on the produc-
tivity of Mexican plants.
The present study is related to various strands of literature. The pioneer set of studies
collected in Roberts and Tybout (1996) analyzed the evolution of ﬁrm-level produc-
tivity dynamics in response to trade reforms and economic integralation for various
developing countries. More recently, the interest has moved towards the identiﬁca-
tion of the diﬀerent channels and mechanisms behind the impact of trade reforms on
productivity (Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti 2004, Girma, Greenaway, and
Kneller 2004, Pavcnik 2002, Tybout 2001, Amiti and Konings 2007, Fernandes 2007).
Our research also draws on the lessons learned from the industrial organisation litera-
1In the paper we refer interchangeably to ﬁrm or plant to identify the unit of observation of
our study, however this refers to the unit of observation of our data that is “the manufacturing
establishment where the production takes place”
2ture examining the impact of increased competition on industry dynamics (Olley and
Pakes 1996). Finally, the present study explicitly builds on the recent theoretical litera-
ture on trade models with heterogeneous ﬁrms.2 All of these studies provide important
theoretical underpinnings for understanding the mechanisms through which economic
integration aﬀects productivity dynamics at the ﬁrm-level.
The present study builds a conceptual framework to analyze the relationship between
economic integration and ﬁrm-level productivity distinguishing four transmission mech-
anisms: (1) enhanced competition, (2) access to intermediate inputs, (3) exports, and
(4) FDI. Following a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation procedure, we are able to cap-
ture the productivity growth diﬀerentials between integrated and non-integrated ﬁrms
during a period before and after NAFTA. Contrary to previous studies, our approach
allows for a heterogeneous productivity impact between ﬁrms with diﬀerent integration
status. In other words, the productivity eﬀects of trade liberalization will be diﬀerent
between ﬁrms whose only link with the international markets is given via the import of
intermediate inputs, ﬁrms whose link is though exports of ﬁnal goods, and ﬁrms that
are importing inputs and exporting ﬁnal produce, i.e. fully integrated ﬁrms.
Our results show that NAFTA stimulated the productivity of Mexican plants via:
(1) an increase in import competition and (2) a positive eﬀect on access to imported
intermediate inputs. However, the impact of trade reforms was not identical for all
integrated ﬁrms with fully integrated ﬁrms beneﬁting more than other integrated ﬁrms.
Contrary to previous results, once self-selection problems are solved, we ﬁnd a rather
weak relationship between exports and productivity growth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 brieﬂy develops the conceptual framework
describing the diﬀerent trade-productivity transmission channels. The data used for
the empirical analysis, Mexico’s macroeconomic background, and trends in ﬁrm-level
productivity are shown in Section 3. Section 4 describes our econometric approach
and shows the results of various speciﬁcations. This Section also discusses potential
endogeneity and selection problems, as well as the diﬃculties in isolating the impact
of NAFTA from the peso devaluation of 1994. Finally, Section 5concludes.
2Among the most inﬂuential studies in this ﬁeld include the following contributions: Melitz (2003),
Bernard, Eaton, Jenson, and Kortum (2003), Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007), Yeaple (2005),
Verhoogen (2008), Bustos (2007).
32 Trade-Productivity Linkages
Economic theory predicts that trade reforms can aﬀect ﬁrm-level productivity through
several channels. This Section describes the theoretical linkages behind these channels,
representing the basis for the empirical analysis. As it is depicted by Figure 1, there
is not a unique and well-deﬁned model capturing the trade and productivity linkages,
but rather a number of diﬀerent approaches aimed at capturing diﬀerent mechanisms
through which economic integration can impact ﬁrms’ performance. In Figure 1 we
identify four main channels through which trade reforms can inﬂuence productivity:
competition, intermediate inputs, exports, FDI. Each one of this channels can aﬀect
both internal restructuring, i.e. productivity changes within the ﬁrm, and external
restructuring, i.e. productivity changes due to market shares reallocation between
ﬁrms, exit and entry. In the next sub-Sections we discuss in detail each one of these
channels, except the FDI one because, due to data limitations, we are unable to study
this channel in our empirical analysis.
Figure 1: Trade-Productivity Linkages: Conceptual Framework
42.1 Competition Channel
Trade liberalization and tariﬀ reductions are expected to increase the competitive pres-
sures to which domestic ﬁrms are exposed. This eﬀect is expected to be stronger for
import-competing ﬁrms and import-competing sectors than for export-oriented ones.
The ﬁrst studies to formally explore this argument and relate the increase of the com-
petitive pressures to an improvement of intra-ﬁrm eﬃciency were Martin (1978) and
Martin and Page (1983). These authors argued that an increase in competitive pres-
sures would reduce the “X-ineﬃciency”, deﬁned as the gap between actual productivity
and the maximum productivity achievable (Leibenstein 1966, Leibenstein 1978). The
intuition behind their argument is that the eﬃciency of a ﬁrm is, ceteris paribus, a
positive function of the managers’ eﬀorts (“internal restructuring” in Figure 1) and
this, in turn, is triggered by the exposure to foreign competitors.
A second productivity eﬀect of increase competition is given by its impact on ﬁrm
size and size distribution; in fact, traditional trade models with homogeneous goods
and identical ﬁrms assume that scale eﬀects are the principal drivers of productivity
changes following trade liberalization. In a world where ﬁrms are heterogenous, the
import-competing channel can explain changes in aggregate economic through “exter-
nal restructuring”, as less eﬃcient ﬁrms are forced to contract or exit (Disney, Haskel,
and Heden 2003). This is shown clearly in Melitz and Ottaviano’s (2008) and Bernard,
Redding, and Schott’s (2007) models, where the increased competition leads to the exit
and contraction of less productive ﬁrms, while more productive ones expand.
2.2 Intermediate Inputs Channel
Economic theory suggests that liberalization of intermediate inputs will increase pro-
ductivity levels of domestic ﬁrms due to an expansion in the menu of available inter-
mediate inputs. This allows individual producers to match more appropriately their
technology or product characteristics with the intermediate input used (Feenstra and
al. 1999).3
Another line of thought, linked to the endogenous growth models, suggests that the
3Formally, economic theory provides us with models where specialised inputs are characterised
by increasing returns (i.e. high initial capital and learning costs) and consequently the degree of
diﬀerentiation is limited by the size of the market. In this model, the liberalization of intermediate
inputs will increase the varieties of available inputs, some of them more specialised and closer in terms
of complementarity to the domestic ones.
5import of “tangible commodities facilitate the exchange of intangible ideas” (Grossman
and Helpman 1991a, Grossman and Helpman 1991b). This model emphasises the
learning eﬀects of imports of intermediate inputs as a mechanism through which trade
will impact productivity growth.
In Bernard, Eaton, Jenson, and Kortum’s (2003) model with heterogenous ﬁrms the
impact of trade reforms on productivity is given via a reduction in the price of in-
termediates inputs (i.e. cheaper and higher quality imported inputs replace domestic
ones). All ﬁrms beneﬁt from the intermediate inputs price reduction, and this eﬀect
goes in hand with market reallocation from less productive ﬁrms to more productive
ones.
2.3 Exports Channel
The literature suggests that the expansion of exports could work as another channel
explaining the positive inﬂuence of economic integration on ﬁrm-level performance.
Grossman and Helpman (1991a) and Grossman and Helpman (1991b) assume that
domestic entrepreneurs enlarge the stock of domestic knowledge by increasing their
contacts with foreign buyers. Similarly, Fernandes and Isgut (2005), based on Arrow’s
(1962) learning-by-exporting model, show that exporting activities have learning exter-
nalities that decrease over time and increase with the level of exports. Finally, at least
three other hypotheses have been explored to explain productivity improvements as a
consequence of export expansion. First, by having access to foreign markets, a ﬁrm
can exploit economies of scale and increase its productivity. Second, relying on foreign
markets can help ﬁrms to better absorb the negative shocks deriving from a contraction
in domestic demand. Third, if the foreign markets are characterized by a higher degree
of competition than domestic markets, then exporters will be under higher competitive
pressures in those foreign markets increasing their incentives to innovate and become
more eﬃcient in order to access foreign markets. If the outlined mechanisms are valid,
exporting ﬁrms will exhibit higher long-term productivity growth than non-integrated
ﬁrms (Wagner 2002). The export channel will be particularly relevant when a country
is granted additional market access as a result of a Regional Trade Agreement (RTA),
such as NAFTA.
As we have seen in this Section, economic theory identiﬁes diﬀerent channels of trans-
mission between trade reforms and ﬁrm-level productivity. If these transmission mech-
anisms are at work, post-reform ﬁrm-level productivity performance will be a function
6of the ﬁrm’s integration status. In other words, the productivity path followed by
integrated ﬁrms will diﬀer, ceteris paribus, from their non-integrated counterparts.
Furthermore, given the nature of the trade-productivity linkages, we would expect a
heterogeneous post-reform productivity growth pattern even among integrated ﬁrms.
For example, ﬁrms that are only exporting will bear directly the eﬀects of the ex-
ports channel without experiencing, at least not directly, the positive eﬀects of other
trade-productivity linkages. In order to capture the diﬀerent channels of transmission,
in the following Sections we will analyze the data categorizing ﬁrms into one of four
groups based on their integration status: fully integrated, exporters, importers and
non-integrated ﬁrms.
Many of mechanisms behind the channels illustrated in Figure 1 and explained above
will aﬀect all ﬁrms regardless of their integration status. For example, the enhanced
market access abroad that stimulates the expansion of export-oriented ﬁrms an indirect
impact also on domestic ﬁrms through general equilibrium eﬀects. Nevertheless, based
on theoretical considerations, ﬁrm’s integration status will determine the magnitude
of its own trade-mandated productivity shock. In other words, a-priori a process of
trade integration would have an asymmetric productivity impact on integrated versus
non-integrated ﬁrms, and perhaps this impact could diﬀer between ﬁrms in diﬀerent
integration status.
3 Descriptive Analysis
3.1 Macroeconomic Overview: NAFTA and the Devaluation
The present study covers the period from 1993 to 2002, a time characterized by major
changes in the Mexican economy. In January 1994, NAFTA, a trilateral treaty between
Canada, Mexico and the US, was enacted. In December of that same year, as a
consequence of a balance of payments crisis, the Mexican peso lost more than 60 percent
of its value in terms of US dollars. This was the starting point of a profound economic
crisis where GDP contracted by more than 8 percent and inﬂation passed from an
annual rate of 7 percent in 1994 to 41 percent in 1995. The huge devaluation together
with the contraction of the domestic market stimulated exports of Mexican produce.
As we can see from Figure 2, between 1994 and 1996, the importance of international
trade in the Mexican economy (measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP)
almost doubled, passing from a pre-crisis/NAFTA level of 38 percent to 63 percent in
1996. The export boom during the period 1994-2002 was led by manufacturing exports,
7which accounted for 95 percent of total exports.
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Some important elements emerge from Figure 2. First, the process of trade liberal-
ization in Mexico started in the 1980s. When trade liberalization is measured as a
reduction in tariﬀs, the most important reforms were undertaken during the second
half of the 1980s (Peters 2000). A second interesting point, is that the response of
the economy to this ﬁrst wave of liberalization was rather slow, with trade volumes
showing only a modest increase after large tariﬀ reductions. On the other hand, the
relatively small reduction in tariﬀs observed after NAFTA was followed by a substan-
tial increase in the importance of trade volumes in the Mexican economy. These facts
suggest that the substantial increase in economic integration between the Mexican and
the US economies is explained by a combination of NAFTA and the peso devaluation.
In other words, the peso devaluation pushed Mexican ﬁrms into the foreign markets
that were opened via the window of NAFTA; once many of the Mexican manufactur-
ers had absorbed the sunk costs of entering foreign markets, they remained integrated
despite the revaluation of the Mexico peso during the late 1990s. This may explain
the signiﬁcant increase in the degree of openness that occurred after the devaluation,
which was not reversed even when the real exchange rate revalued. A second comple-
mentary explanation behind the pattern followed by openness is that NAFTA implied
much more than a tariﬀ reduction scheme, involving deep regulatory and institutional
8changes, representing a successful case of deep integration.4
3.2 Firm Size and Integration Status
In order to see how the post NAFTA/devaluation aﬀected the performance of Mexican
manufacturing ﬁrms, we use ﬁrm-level data from the Annual Industrial Survey (EIA)
covering the period from 1993 to 2002. EIA surveys more than 5,000 ﬁrms covering 85
percent of total industrial production. The survey provides plant-level information on
characteristics such as number of employees, hours worked, wages, value of production
and sales, exports, value of intermediate inputs, inventories, investment, etc. (for more
detail see Iacovone (2008)).
As we mentioned before, using the theoretical considerations discussed in Section 2
we allocate ﬁrms into one of the following four mutually exclusive groups according to
their integration status: (1) exporters, (2) importers, (3) fully integrated, and (4) non-
integrated ﬁrms. The ﬁrst group consists of ﬁrms that are exporting into the foreign
markets without importing intermediate goods; the second group is made up of ﬁrms
whose only link with the global markets is via the import of intermediate inputs. The
third group is formed by all those ﬁrms that sell part of their ﬁnal production in the
foreign markets while importing part of their intermediate inputs. Finally, the last
group consists of ﬁrms that do not have any direct link with foreign markets.5
Figures 3 shows information regarding the number of ﬁrms and their size by integra-
tion status for a given year (1997). In 1997, 2,372 ﬁrms, representing more than 40
percent of the total manufacturing ﬁrms in Mexico, had no direct linkage with the
international markets. In that same year, 10 percent of Mexican manufacturing ﬁrms
were integrated to international markets via exports, 19 percent via imports, and 28
percent were importing intermediate inputs and exporting their ﬁnal product (fully
integrated).
4By means of an explicit econometric model linking tariﬀ reduction and household real income,
De Hoyos (2005) ﬁnds that measuring NAFTA just as the reduction in tariﬀ brought about by the
agreement would lead to the conclusion that the agreement had almost no impact on real household
incomes in the economy.
5Notice that this is not entirely true. For non-integrated ﬁrms to be completely isolated from
direct linkages with foreign markets they would have to be part of a sector that does not suﬀer from
import-competition and at the same time is not receiving FDI. Even using detailed data such as EIA,
it is impossible to deﬁne if and to what degree a ﬁrm is in an “import-competing” sector. Hence the
import competition channel will have an eﬀect on integrated and non-integrated ﬁrms according to
our deﬁnition. Nonetheless, a-priori, trade reform will have a smaller impact on non-integrated ﬁrms
relatively to integrated ﬁrms.
9Figure 3: Size distribution by integration status









In 1997, the great majority of the numerous non-integrated ﬁrms were micro or small
plants.6 Both exporters and importers have a similar composition in terms of ﬁrm
size, with around 40 percent being small and 30 percent being medium ﬁrms. Finally,
the fully integrated ﬁrms, that simultaneously export and make use of imported in-
termediate inputs, are the largest ones, with virtually no micro ﬁrms being part of
this category. In 1997, three and four out of 10 ﬁrms had a medium or large size,
respectively.
3.3 Trade Shock, Integration Status, Labor Productivity
As we mentioned above, integration was mainly brought about by a combination of
NAFTA and the peso devaluation. We have also shown that non-integrated and ex-
porting ﬁrms tend to be smaller than importing and fully integrated ones. In order to
explore how the patterns of integration may have aﬀected the size of the ﬁrms, Figure 4
shows the time trend in the proportion of integrated ﬁrms (all three integration status
groups) and their average size (measured as total employees). According to Figure 4,
the proportion of integrated ﬁrms increased steadily from 1993 to 1997 (continuous
line). Regarding the size of the ﬁrm (measured as the number of employees), apart
from the change occurring between 1993 and 1995, the average size of integrated ﬁrms
increased throughout the period. It is interesting to note that 1994 is the only year
6Micro ﬁrms are deﬁned as plants with less than 16 employees, small plants have between 16 and
100 employees, medium are those ﬁrms with more than 100 but less than 250 employees, while large
have more than 250 employees.
10when NAFTA was at work in the absence of a devaluation eﬀect.7 Between 1993 and
1994, the average size of integrated ﬁrms remained constant, while the proportion of
integrated ﬁrms increased. Therefore, NAFTA (in the absence of a devaluation) helped
relatively small ﬁrms to incorporate into the global markets.8 After 1995, when the
devaluation eﬀect was very strong, even smaller ﬁrms where pushed into the global
markets, hence explaining the increase in the proportion of integrated ﬁrms and the re-
duction in their average size. After 1995, the changes in the distribution of size among
integrated ﬁrms in the market can be attributed to a combination of NAFTA and the
peso devaluation. The simultaneity of these two events resulted in an expansion of
integrated ﬁrms but this time the small ones (many of the exporters and to a lesser
extent the importers) were not able to survive the crises. Therefore, the average size
of the integrated ﬁrms increased after 1995. This increase in the average size among
integrated ﬁrms after the trade reforms is consistent with trade models ` a la Melitz
(Melitz 2003, Bernard, Redding, and Schott 2007, Melitz and Ottaviano 2008).
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Figure 5 shows the performance in value added labor productivity per hour by integra-
tion status. Between 1993 and 1994 (the period of NAFTA without a peso devalua-
tion), average productivity in all integration groups rose, with the fully integrated ﬁrms
beneﬁting most. After the peso devaluation and until 1996, labor productivity of inte-
grated and non-integrated ﬁrms decreased with the non-integrated ﬁrms experiencing
7Given that the peso crisis took place on the 20 December 1994, the eﬀect of the devaluation is
not captured by the data from year 1994.
8Yet another way of interpreting the increase in small integrated ﬁrms between 1993 and 1994 is by
assuming that larger ﬁrms had a better chance of anticipating NAFTA, therefore integrating before
the agreement was enacted.
11the largest negative shock. Between 1996 and 2000, all integrated ﬁrms experienced
a reduction in labor productivity as opposed to the non-integrated ﬁrms, that were
catching up. This strongly suggests that the post NAFTA/devaluation trade expan-
sion had asymmetric eﬀects on ﬁrms based on their integration status, in particular in
terms of their productivity performance.





















































This Section shows that there is a great degree of heterogeneity in size, sector of special-
ization and productivity between ﬁrms with a diﬀerent integration status. Exporting
ﬁrms are similar in size to non-integrated ﬁrms although their level of labor produc-
tivity is higher with a level closer to the one exhibit by importing ﬁrms. Descriptive
statistics also show that importers, as well as fully integrated ﬁrms, are concentrated
in two capital intensive sectors: “machinery and equipment” and “chemical products”.
Finally, the labor productivity trends show that NAFTA marked a turning point in
productivity performance between ﬁrms with diﬀerent integration status.
The rest of this paper will try to explore how much of the diﬀerential in labor produc-
tivity shown in Figure 5 is attributable to the increase in trade integration observed
between 1993 and 2002. In our empirical strategy we take 1993 as the base year (pe-
riod before NAFTA), compare the productivity growth rate between integrated and
non-integrated ﬁrms (controlling for ﬁrm-level characteristics and allowing for hetero-
geneous eﬀects across integration status) and attribute these diﬀerence to the reforms.
Since many other factors can inﬂuence the productivity growth rate diﬀerentials, a for-
mal econometric analysis is needed to control for other variables potentially inﬂuencing
the patterns observed in Figure 5.
124 Empirical Strategy
In this Section we formally evaluate the impact of NAFTA on ﬁrm-level productivity.
There are two possible approaches that we can follow to disentangle the relationship
between trade integration and ﬁrm-level productivity: (1) link tariﬀ reductions with
ﬁrm-level productivity whilst controlling for other possible eﬀects; or (2) compare the
diﬀerential of productivity growth rates between integrated and non-integrated ﬁrms
before and after the reforms controlling for observables and unobservable ﬁxed eﬀects.
Both approaches have their advantages and limitations hence, in this study, we combine
both of them in order to identify separately all the channels discussed in Section 2.
Identifying the impact of trade reforms exploiting tariﬀ reductions has one important
advantage but also some serious drawbacks. On the positive side, this approach is able
to isolate neatly the impact of an important element of trade reforms, such as tariﬀ
reductions, from all other trade-related exogenous shocks. However, this advantage
can also be a source of weakness. If we believe that trade reforms involve much more
than just a reduction in tariﬀ rates, focusing solely on tariﬀ variations will lead to an
under-estimation of the impact of trade reforms. This appears to be a very important
issue in the case of NAFTA since, as discussed in Section 3, the changes in tariﬀ
rates were relatively modest9 . In fact, as it is argued in Kose, Meredith, and Towe
(2004) and Lederman, Maloney, and Serven (2003), the major changes introduced by
NAFTA took the form of new rules and institutions to promote integration among the
trade partners.10 Exploiting tariﬀ reductions to identify the productivity impact of
trade reforms introduces a further technical problem involving the identiﬁcation of the
impact of tariﬀs on intermediate inputs.
Although it is virtually impossible to identify NAFTA’s full productivity impact by fo-
cusing only on tariﬀ variations, the information contained in the post-reform reductions
in import tariﬀs is enough to identify the eﬀect of the reforms via the import-competing
9During direct interviews conducted with entrepreneurs, academics and policy-makers in Mexico,
the argument that NAFTA’s changes were much larger than those that could be measured by the
change in tariﬀs came out as a consensus.
10An argument supporting the tariﬀ-reduction approach would state that a small tariﬀ change that
is perceived as permanent can have a larger impact than a larger change that is perceived as unstable.
The “bilateral nature” of NAFTA made the tariﬀ change much more credible than the unilateral
tariﬀ liberalization that took place during the second half of the 1980s. Furthermore, NAFTA is
considered by some scholars “as a way of locking in previous policy reforms” (Tomz 1997, Whalley
1993). Therefore, one can argue that the reduction in trade barriers could serve as a proxy for the
legal and institutional change. Nevertheless, the nature of the exact relationship between changes in
tariﬀs and changes in institutions is not clearly deﬁned.
13channel. As mentioned in Section 2.1, controlling for everything else, a reduction in
import tariﬀs should increase domestic competition and hence boost labor productiv-
ity. The present study uses tariﬀ variations to identify the link between NAFTA and
labor productivity via the import-competing channel. Nevertheless, we complement
this approach with a pseudo-experimental procedure that identiﬁes all other trade-
productivity channels discussed in Section 2.
As discussed in Section 2, theoretical models with heterogeneous ﬁrms suggest that
trade reforms will impact asymmetrically on diﬀerent types of ﬁrms. We expect inte-
grated ﬁrms to be positively aﬀected by the reforms relative to non-integrated ﬁrms.
Moreover, the impact within integrated ﬁrms could be diﬀerent depending on a ﬁrm’s
integrated status. This idea is not only based on theoretical considerations but also
appears to emerge from the descriptive statistics presented in Section 3 suggesting
that plants within diﬀerent “integration status” show a diﬀerent productivity evolution
over time. Hence, a crucial identifying assumption behind the pseudo-experimental ap-
proach adopted in this paper is that the reforms introduced by NAFTA had a diﬀerent
eﬀect on pre-reform integrated and non-integrated ﬁrms.
Our strategy builds on the previous work by Pavcnik (2002) and L´ opez-C´ ordova (2003)
analyzing the impact of trade reforms in Chile and Mexico, respectively. While L´ opez-
C´ ordova (2003) exploits tariﬀ variations Pavcnik (2002) uses a quasi-experimental ap-
proach (i.e. treatment versus control group). The mayor diﬀerence between these
two closely related studies and the empirical approach followed in this paper are the
following:
1. Pavcnik (2002) deﬁned a ﬁrm as being integrated when it belonged to a “in-
tegrated” sector—at 4 digits of the ISIC classiﬁcation—regardless of the ﬁrm’s
integration status. Thanks to data availability, in this paper we deﬁne the inte-
gration status at the ﬁrm level.11
2. Within integrated ﬁrms, our approach allows for a heterogeneous impact of the
reforms among ﬁrms with diﬀerent integration status, i.e. exporters, importers
or fully integrated.
3. Our econometric approach controls for possible endogeneity problems related to
a ﬁrm’s decision to change integration status; and it also attacks the attrition
problem present in the Mexican industrial survey (EIA).
11We evaluated the correlation between the deﬁnition used by Pavcnik (2002) and our deﬁnition
and found out this is only about .30.
144.1 Econometric Approach
The objective of the econometric strategy is to understand the impact of NAFTA on
ﬁrm-level productivity. For this purpose we use the value-added per unit of hourly
labor as productivity index.12. The reason of our choice lies in the simplicity in the
interpretation of this index and in its transparency. Moreover, the direct link between
value-added labor productivity and national welfare makes this index attractive from
a policy perspective. However, this index also has some drawbacks, the principal one
being that two ﬁrms may diﬀer in their value-added labor productivity based solely on
diﬀerences in their capital intensity. In order to address this issue, in our regressions
we control for the stock of capital per worker
Let us deﬁne ϕit as the log of the value-added per hourly worker in ﬁrm i at time
t. Similarly, let Xijt be a vector containing a set of ﬁrm-level characteristics, as well
as industry and location ﬁxed eﬀects. Let τit be the domestic import tariﬀs under
NAFTA; in other words, τit are the tariﬀs faced by foreign competitors of ﬁrm i in time
t. Productivity is assumed to be a function of a constant, time and integration status,
the interaction between the former and the latter, import tariﬀs, and the vector with
covariates Xijt:
















it × Timet + θ · Xijt + ψτit + εit (1)
Where Timet t = (1994,...,2000), are year dummies capturing economy-wide macroe-
conomic shocks; Integrations
it s = (2,3,4), are a set of binary or dummy variables
taking zero/one values depending on the integration status of the ﬁrm. The reference
category is the group of non-integrated ﬁrms in the pre-NAFTA year 1993. Therefore,
the year dummies will capture overall trends aﬀecting productivity with respect to the
base year, 1993. On the other hand, the integration status dummies will pick up the
diﬀerences between ﬁrms that are integrated versus non-integrated ﬁrms (the excluded
category). The interaction term between these two sets of dummy variables is what
is known in the literature as the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence (DID) estimator capturing the
12For robustness check we tested all our regressions using a multilateral TFP index following Aw,
Chen, and Roberts (2001) and Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982). The results are qualitatively
similar in terms of their size and signs. These results are omitted for reasons of space but are available
upon request.
15treatment eﬀect, in our case the impact of NAFTA. Finally, all the continuous variables
are expressed in logs.
The ﬂexibility of speciﬁcation (1) allows the impact of NAFTA to be diﬀerent across
integration status and these eﬀects are allowed to vary over time. The coeﬃcients
of interest are the treatment eﬀects ˆ δt,s and, if correctly estimated, they capture the
diﬀerences in productivity growth between treated (integrated ﬁrms) and controls (non-
integrated) ﬁrms. The treatment eﬀect is capturing what is known in the literature as
ATT or “average treatment on the treated”, that is, the impact of NAFTA on those
ﬁrms that are already integrated and hence are being directly aﬀected by the agreement.
Notice that, as we mentioned before, NAFTA is likely to have some general equilibrium
eﬀects on all Mexican ﬁrms, including those that are not integrated. Nevertheless,
these are not identiﬁed by our DID coeﬃcient. Similarly, our estimates cannot be used
to quantify the impact of NAFTA on non-integrated ﬁrms had they been integrated
unless we are willing to accept the assumption that the “average treatment on the
non-treated” is equal to the ATT.
If trade reforms had a positive eﬀect on the productivity of integrated ﬁrms the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence coeﬃcients should be positive. Therefore, exploiting the het-
erogeneous impact introduced by NAFTA (both across ﬁrms with diﬀerent integration
status and over time), our coeﬃcients, ˆ δt,s, capture the impact of the reforms on pro-
ductivity separating the various trade-productivity channels without restricting the
eﬀect to take place only via tariﬀ reduction. Analytically, the treatment eﬀects are
deﬁned by the following equation:
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The DID approach makes two important assumptions that need to hold in order to
properly identify the treatment eﬀect (Wooldridge 2002, Blundell and Costa Dias 2000).
The ﬁrst assumption is that the treatment is not correlated with time-varying unob-
servables. The second assumption is that the macroeconomic shocks aﬀect all ﬁrms in
a similar fashion. The time dummies capture economy-wide macroeconomic changes,
such as the sharp devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994. Intuitively, it is
plausible that exchange rate movements will have diﬀerent impacts on ﬁrms with diﬀer-
ent integration status. Hence, this could potentially introduce a bias into our treatment
estimates.13 Assessing the plausibility of the underlying assumptions is complex and
13Formally, as explained by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000), if the macro trends captured by the
16we will discuss this further when presenting our results.
Bearing all the assumptions and limitations in mind, the DID is a powerful tool able
to identify the impact of a particular policy on a speciﬁc outcome variable. The DID
framework captures the impact of policy interventions controlling for status-speciﬁc
characteristics that are time-invariant (see equation 2). Therefore, all the time-invariant
initial ﬁrm characteristics that may have inﬂuenced the selection of the ﬁrm into a
speciﬁc integration status will not inﬂuence our results.
As is clear from equation 1, the DID framework is complemented with a tariﬀ reduction
approach capturing the impact of import competition via coeﬃcient ψ. If lowering
import tariﬀ rates increases domestic competition and this, in turn, has a positive
eﬀect on productivity, then coeﬃcient ψ should be negative.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Naive OLS
The ﬁrst set of models use all the ﬁrms in our sample to run OLS for two diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of equation (1). All the results presented here correct for potential auto-
correlation across ﬁrms using clustered-robust standard errors at the ﬁrm-level. Given
the large number of model speciﬁcations and coeﬃcients estimated, the detailed results
are presented in Table 1 of Appendix A. We start oﬀ with a parsimonious version of
equation 1, which includes only the treatment eﬀects with no controls (model (1) in
Table 1 ). In the second column we add the Mexican tariﬀs under NAFTA to cap-
ture the competition channel. In the following two speciﬁcations we respectively add
industry and location ﬁxed eﬀects – model (3) – and also plant-level controls in model
(4).
A ﬁrst remark when comparing these four speciﬁcations is that, as we would expect,
the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects and extra controls tends to decrease the size of the DID
estimates.
year dummy impacts asymmetrically “treated” and “non-treated” ﬁrms our estimated diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence coeﬃcients, ˆ δ
Int
DID, recovers not only the eﬀect of the treatment on integrated ﬁrms but also
the diﬀerential eﬀect of the macro-trend across the two groups. If we deﬁne this diﬀerential eﬀect of




















17Let us ﬁrst concentrate on the the results for the dummy variables identifying the
productivity eﬀects of the three integration status (βs in equation 1). According to our
parsimonious speciﬁcation, in 1993, integrated ﬁrms (regardless of their integration
status) had an average productivity higher than non-integrated ﬁrms. This result
contrasts with the parameter estimated from the full speciﬁcation with all the controls
(model 4). In fact, once all the control variables are included, it is apparent that
the initial integration premium is actually explained by diﬀerences in the values of
the plant-level characteristics between integrated and non-integrated ﬁrms and not by
integration per se. Plant characteristics such as size, capital per worker, investment in
research and development, and foreign participation are all positively correlated with
productivity, however, we need to emphasise that these variables may be endogenous
and are not the main focus of our study. Indeed, we are including them here to avoid
an omitted variable bias on our main coeﬃcient of interests that are the δs of the
treatments.
Although a ﬁrm’s integration status cannot account for initial productivity diﬀeren-
tials, it might still explain diﬀerences in productivity growth across ﬁrms, which is our
variable of interest. In order to concentrate our discussion on the coeﬃcients captur-
ing the heterogeneity in productivity performance across integration status, i.e. the
treatment eﬀects, in Figure 6 we plot the evolution of δt,s over time.14 Although we
do not report conﬁdence intervals for the plotted coeﬃcients (the signiﬁcance of the
parameters is reported in Table 1), Figure 6 captures the trends followed by the treat-
ment eﬀects. As is apparent from Figure 6, the treatment eﬀects for importer and fully
integrated ﬁrms are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all post-NAFTA
years, except 2000-2001 for the importers. On the other hand, the eﬀect of NAFTA on
productivity growth of exporters was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the agreement’s
eﬀect on non-integrated ﬁrms’ productivity performance, the control group, in most
of the years. Another ﬁnding that is important to underscore is that the coeﬃcient
for “fully integrated ﬁrms” are always larger than the others, this seems to point the
importance of the complementarity between exports and imports activities as channels
to promote productivity growth.
In order to put the treatment eﬀects into context, our results show that during the
post-NAFTA period, annual labor productivity of fully integrated plants grew between
10 and 25 percent faster than labor productivity of non-integrated ones. The treatment
eﬀect was somehow smaller for importers, with an annual growth diﬀerential between 12
percent and 20 percent with respect to non-integrated ﬁrms. The results from the full
14The coeﬃcients are taken from the full model, i.e. those reported in the fourth column of Table
1 of Appendix ??.
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speciﬁcation highlight important elements of heterogeneity related to the integration
status of the ﬁrm. Hence splitting integrated ﬁrms in diﬀerent groups taking into
account their integration status (i.e. exporter, importer, or fully integrated) allows us
to capture heterogenous treatment eﬀects that would otherwise be ignored if we were
lumping together all integrated ﬁrms regardless of their integration status as some
previous studies did (Pavcnik 2002, L´ opez-C´ ordova 2003).
Regarding the import-competing channel, as expected a priori, the coeﬃcient on the
log of import tariﬀs (ψ in equation 1) is negative. Everything else constant, a ﬁrm
facing a tariﬀ reduction equal to, say, 10 percent tends to increase its productivity by
1 percent. Under NAFTA, Mexican tariﬀs were reduced from an average of 16 percent
to 5 percent, or 11 percentage points, representing a reduction of almost 69 percent on
average tariﬀ. According to our results, this policy decision, fostered competition and
increased ﬁrm-level productivity by 6.8 percent (69*0.099).
Another concern that we try to control for is the issue of exit from the sample. Every
year about 5-10 percent of plants exit the sample because of attrition and not taking
this into account may generate a bias. In order to control for this we follow Amiti
and Konings (2007) and re-estimate our equation by adding a dummy that is equal
to one when the plant is going to exit in t + 1 and zero otherwise. The results are
shown in column (5) of Table 1 and conﬁrm that future exiting ﬁrms tend indeed to
have a signiﬁcatively lower productivity than other plants, however our results are
substantially unchanged.
As it was mentioned before, an important methodological diﬀerence between the present
19study and that of (Pavcnik 2002) is that the treatments here are identiﬁed at the ﬁrm-
level as oppose to (Pavcnik 2002) who identiﬁes it at the sector-level. What kind of
biased was imposed in (Pavcnik 2002) while aggregating diﬀerent ﬁrms in the same sec-
tor? Estimating an speciﬁcation including Mexican import tariﬀs as controls, similar to
(2) in Table 1, but identifying treated ﬁrms at the 4-digit sector level, shows that sector-
level identiﬁcation leads to smaller treatment eﬀects. Hence the productivity eﬀects of
Chilean integration is higher than the results presented in (Pavcnik 2002).
4.2.2 Controlling for Potential Endogeneity of Treatment and Evaluating
the Role of Switchers
As mentioned before, if the assumption of exogeneity of the treatment (being integrated
within a trade liberalization period) is violated and our treatments are correlated with
some unobservable characteristics, the OLS estimated coeﬃcients will be biased. So far
we have tried to alleviate this endogeneity problem by including ﬁrm-level variables as
controls. If the decision to become integrated (treatment) is correlated with any of the
observable characteristics used as controls, our results are still consistent. However, the
problem of endogenous treatment is especially acute in our case because we have to deal
with what is an established ﬁnding in the literature: most eﬃcient (and productive)
ﬁrms self-select into export markets (Bernard and Bradford Jensen 1999, Melitz 2003).
It is therefore reasonable to expect a causal relationship from productivity levels to
integration status. If this is true, the coeﬃcients presented in the previous Sections
may be biased.
Table 1 presents the number of ﬁrms that change status in each of the years of the
sample distinguishing between those that begin importing or exporting and those that
stop importing or exporting. We can see that there is a substantial number of plants,
about 20 percent, that switch integration status every year.
In order to tackle this potential endogeneity problem, we re-estimate our model using a
reduced sample that includes only ﬁrms that remain within the same integration status
throughout the period of analysis and exclude “switchers” or ﬁrms that at some point
change integration status. By excluding the switchers, we artiﬁcially avoid the problem
of self-select into the treatment.
When we re-estimate our main equation by excluding the switchers we also include
a dummy identifying those plants that in t + 1 will switch to a diﬀerent integration
status. The results are reported in Column (1) of Table 2 and are qualitatively similar
to the results of our basic model discussed previously in Section 4.2.1. The fact that our
20Table 1: Number of “switchers”
Year Begin Import Begin Export Stop Import Stop Export
1994 341 355 336 343
1995 291 566 432 186
1996 321 399 340 224
1997 359 346 278 249
1998 208 196 404 329
1999 295 296 216 251
2000 220 237 191 277
2001 172 182 277 322
2002 114 128 250 286
Total 2,321 2,705 2,724 2,467
results are robust when excluding switchers is encouraging and seems to point towards
the idea that our ﬁndings are indeed not driven by endogenous treatments. However,
by excluding non-random observations we may be potentially biasing our coeﬃcients.
For this reason, we address this selection problem using a Heckman selection model for

























it = 1 if ﬁrm i is not a switcher
or Y
′
it = 0 if ﬁrm i is a switcher
Following Heckman (1979) we proceed in two steps. First, we estimate equation 4 with
a probit. Second, we estimate our main equation 3 using the ˆ γ obtained from the ﬁrst
step to construct the inverse Mills ratio. Equation 4 is the selection equation where
Z′
it is a superset of X′
ijt includes all the explanatory variables in the primary equation
plus the exclusionary restriction. Melitz’s (2003) model suggests that a plant will be
domestic if its productivity is under a certain threshold and will start exporting if its
productivity is above that threshold. In general, a plant will be in a speciﬁc integration
status to the extent that its productivity falls within a certain range. We will re-
interpret this model by arguing that we expect a plant is more likely to be a switcher if
21its productivity is “too diﬀerent” from the productivity of those plant that are similar
in terms of integration status and sector. Therefore, we calculate the absolute value
of the diﬀerence between the productivity of a given plant and the median within the
same status and sector. Hence, the exclusionary restriction (instrument) in system (3)
and (4) is a dissimilarity index which measures the absolute productivity distance from
“similar plants”.
The results are reported in column (2) of Table 2 and conﬁrm that there is evidence
of a selection bias as λ, the coeﬃcient of the Mills Ratio, is statistically signiﬁcant.
Analyzing the coeﬃcients from column (2), and comparing them with the “naive re-
sults” or column (4) from the previous Table, we can conclude that when we exclude
the switchers and account for the selection bias our coeﬃcients get larger, in particular
the coeﬃcients for “exporters” become signiﬁcant. Basically, except for the coeﬃcients
of exporters, these results conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings. Another interesting point to
observe is the result of the ﬁrst-stage selection equation, consistently with our expec-
tation we ﬁnd that an increase in productivity dissimilarity reduces the probability of
selecting into the sample, that is those plants which productivity was in 1993 “distant”
from the median plant with their same integration and within the same sector were
consequently more likely to switch to a diﬀerent integration status. Interestingly this
relationship between “productivity dissimilarity” and probability of switching is non
linear.
Finally, if we were to think that the “switching” status is some attribute that is not time
varying but instead a ﬁxed characteristic we can re-estimate our model by introducing
a dummy that identiﬁes switchers irrespectively of when these plants actually switch.
We do so in column (3) of Table 2. Even further, we generalize this model by re-
estimating using a ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator which would control for unobservable time
invariant characteristics, and present the results in column (4) of the same Table.
These results are substantially similar to the “naive results” or column (4) from Table
1 and suggest that our main results do not appear to be driven by the self-selection
into the integration status.
Concluding this Section we want to underscore a ﬁnal regarding how are attempt at
controlling for endogenous self-selection into the treatment. Modeling adequately this
switching process is extremely complex because of two main reasons. First, because it
is very diﬃcult to adequately capture, with a single reduced-form model, all the twelve
diﬀerent possible processes of switching. Second, even within a single switching process
(e.g. switching from domestic to importer), there are diﬀerent types of switchers. There
are ﬁrms that change status and remain stably in the new status (“stable switchers”)
22and there are ﬁrms that only temporary switch status before returning to their original
status after one or two years. In fact, in Table 2 we can see that if we adopt a relatively
liberal deﬁnition of “stable switchers” by imposing the condition that they remain for
at least 2 years in the new status, including the year of switching, we see that about
25 percent of plants are temporary switchers. If we impose the condition that to be
deﬁned as “stable switcher” a plant needs to remain at least three years in the new
status, including the year of switching, then we see that about one third of switchers
do so only temporarily. However, modelling the process of switching goes certainly
beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 2: Switchers: Stable vs Temporary
At least 2 years in new status At least 3 years in new status
(including year of switching) (including year of switching)
Year All Stable Temp Stable Temp
1994 1,290 984 306 860 430
1995 1,356 1,051 305 909 447
1996 1,176 901 275 759 417
1997 1,133 847 286 714 419
1998 1,050 776 274 670 380
1999 9,58 739 219 628 330
2000 8,57 636 221 555 302
2001 8,58 681 177
2002 7,01
Total 9,379 7,316 2,063 6,477 2,902
4.2.3 NAFTA or Devaluation?
One ﬁnal point that we need to tackle is the extent to which our results are driven
by NAFTA or by the 1994 peso’s devaluation. The reason we need to discuss this is
twofold. First, from a policy perspective, distinguishing between the two is extremely
important. Second, this question is important for the reliability of our estimates.
Unfortunately, the timing of the devaluation is particularly bad, from the perspective
of a study analysing the impact of NAFTA, because NAFTA was enacted on January
1st 1994 and the devaluation occurred in December 1994. Therefore, we can count only
on one year where NAFTA eﬀects were not contaminated by the devaluation: 1994.
23This is the ﬁrst piece of evidence that we can use to address this question. The second
piece of evidence is based on economic reasoning: what do we expect to be the impact
of the devaluation on ﬁrms with diﬀerent integration status?
Analysing the results for 1994, we notice that the impact of NAFTA is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant in all our models for fully integrated plants. During 1994, their
productivity grew by about 15 percent more than the productivity of domestic ﬁrms.
The same can be said for ﬁrms that made use of imported intermediate inputs even
if the coeﬃcients are smaller compared with that of fully integrated plants in the full
sample but are larger in the restricted sample (e.g. when excluding switchers).15 How-
ever, the opposite result emerges for exporter plants as in all models the coeﬃcients
are statistically non signiﬁcant. It follows that if we analyze the year immediately
subsequent to the implementation of NAFTA we observe that for plants that are fully
integrated and that make use of imported intermediate inputs their productivity grew
substantially more than that of domestic ﬁrms. It could be argued that one year is too
short to evaluate the beneﬁts of NAFTA, and we substantially agree with this interpre-
tation. Having said that, the objective here is just to show that the results previously
presented for a period when NAFTA and the eﬀect of devaluation overlap are consis-
tent with the results in the year when the eﬀects of NAFTA are “non-contaminated”
by the eﬀects of the devaluation.
It is reasonable to expect that the exchange rate devaluation can aﬀect ﬁrms with
diﬀerent integration status diﬀerently. In particular, we would expect that the ﬁrst
order impact on ﬁrms that just export will be positive, while the opposite would be
the impact on ﬁrms that just import. The ﬁrst order eﬀect on fully integrated ﬁrms is
harder to predict a priori. Based on this reasoning, we can expect that the coeﬃcients
for ﬁrms that just export could be upward biased, in particular during the period
1995-1998, and the bias should decrase over time when the exchange rate appreciate.
Figure 7 suggests that our results, if anything, follow the opposite pattern, with the
coeﬃcients becoming increasingly large for this group of ﬁrms. It could be said that if
it was not for the devaluation, these coeﬃcients would have otherwise been negative,
but we have no empirical basis to conﬁrm this claim. We can only say that the trend
of our coeﬃcients appears inconsistent with what we would expect if the bias arising
from the devaluation was driving our results. The opposite pattern of bias should be
expected for ﬁrms that just import, but also in this case Figure 7 suggests that our
15A caveat to our argument is that to the extent that the exchange rate appreciate between 1993
and 1994 this may have given to users of imported inputs some “unnatural” advantage. However
the ﬁgure 7 (b) shows that between 1993 and 1994, if anything, there was a small devaluation of the
exchage rate.
24results seem not driven by the bias. If anything, the devaluation should be biasing the
estimates against us ﬁnding positive coeﬃcients. Finally, as already mentioned, the
sign of the bias is hard to predict for fully integrated plants. However we would expect
this to be negligible after 1997-1998 and inexistent for 1994. Once more Figure 7 seems
to suggest that our results do not follow the dramatic trend of the exchange rate.
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We conclude that on the basis of the economic reasoning and the inspection of our
results, we do not ﬁnd evidence that these are driven by the exchange rate devaluation.
If anything, the bias does not appear to be the main driver of our ﬁndings. We cannot
exclude that our results are inﬂuenced by the devaluation but we have no basis to
believe that our results are driven by the exchange rate ﬂuctuations. In fact, because
of their timing, and the similarity in some of their eﬀects, it is very diﬃcult to be able
to disentangle the eﬀects of NAFTA from those of the devaluation. Overall, if we adopt
a more general perspective we can, however, say that our results do not apply narrowly
to NAFTA but more generally to a move towards higher integration and openess of the
overall Mexican economy. In this sense, the devaluation was part of this move and we
are capturing its eﬀects jointly with those of the NAFTA reforms.
5 Conclusions
This paper answers two questions: (1) Did NAFTA reforms make Mexican plants more
productive? (2) If so, through which channels? As opposed to previous studies, we
have been able to identify the trade integration status at the ﬁrm level and not at
the sectoral level (Pavcnik 2002). Also, improving on previous studies that analyze the
25impact of NAFTA, we have attempted to identify an “overall NAFTA impact” (through
the various channels) and not just the impact of tariﬀ changes (L´ opez-C´ ordova 2003).
Furthermore, our empirical analysis overcomes two principal hurdles: endogeneity and
potential sample selection bias. A further complication was generated by the timing
of the peso’s devaluation, which occurred in December 1994 and overlapped with the
period of implementation of NAFTA enacted in January 1994. The papers tries to
tackle all these empirical issues and our results appear to be robust and not driven by
these issues.
The results of this paper conﬁrm the importance of the import-competition channel.
As previously suggested in various empirical studies (Tybout and Westbrook 1995,
Pavcnik 2002, Fernandes 2007), an increase in import competition, measured by a
reduction of import tariﬀs under NAFTA, had a positive eﬀect on stimulating the
productivity of Mexican plants. We also found that the impact of trade reforms is not
identical for all integrated plants. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between
ﬁrms based on the way these are actually integrated to the international markets. In
fact, we found that the beneﬁts to ﬁrms that are fully integrated are normally larger
than the beneﬁts accruing to other types of integrated ﬁrms. In contrast with the
ﬁndings of L´ opez-C´ ordova (2003) but in line with some more recent studies (Amiti and
Konings 2007), our results suggest that imported intermediate inputs can be a crucial
source of productivity growth for ﬁrms, and trade reforms that enhance access to these
inputs can be an important source of a country’s competitiveness. As it was the case
in (Pavcnik 2002, Bernard and Bradford Jensen 1999), we cannot ﬁnd evidence that
exporting is a channel of productivity growth. However, a possible explanation for the
lack of evident improvements in the productivity growth of exporters, as opposed to
importers, could be that the extra market access for Mexican exporters after NAFTA
has been modest given that US tariﬀs were already low. In contrast, the changes for
importers have been more substantial. Furthermore, with the boom in FDI and the
expansion of exports after NAFTA, many of the importers may have found themselves
in the new situation of having to supply MNCs or exporters with far higher demand
standards. The process of catching up with these new demands may be an important
explanation behind the signiﬁcant productivity growth of importers. Unfortunately,
we have no hard evidence to support this hypothesis except some facts presented in
our descriptive analysis (Section 3).
Finally, consistent with various previous studies (Djankov and Hoekman 2000, Evenett
and Voicu 2001), the FDI channel also appears to be an important source of productiv-
ity growth for plants acquired, or with participation shares, by MNCs. However, data
limitations do not allow us to investigate this channel in more detail because the data
26only allow us to identify the foreign ownership of Mexican plants in 1994. For this rea-
son, we decided not to pursue further the study of the impact of FDI and the potential
vertical and horizontal spillovers in this study, even if we are aware of their importance
as drivers of productivity changes in Mexico during the period under analysis.
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30A Appendix 1: Regression Tables
31Table 1: Estimations of DID Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DMX 0.414*** 0.398*** 0.412*** -0.147*** -0.140***
DnMX 0.274*** 0.273*** 0.237*** -0.02 -0.015
DMnX 0.284*** 0.280*** 0.258*** -0.095*** -0.090***
DMX1994 0.254*** 0.261*** 0.254*** 0.128*** 0.129***
DMX1995 0.463*** 0.469*** 0.489*** 0.255*** 0.257***
DMX1996 0.468*** 0.479*** 0.503*** 0.226*** 0.229***
DMX1997 0.300*** 0.312*** 0.354*** 0.183*** 0.187***
DMX1998 0.247*** 0.263*** 0.309*** 0.194*** 0.192***
DMX1999 0.232*** 0.249*** 0.297*** 0.173*** 0.161***
DMX2000 0.118*** 0.136*** 0.184*** 0.100*** 0.089**
DMX2001 0.096** 0.107** 0.154*** 0.097** 0.089**
DMX2002 0.227*** 0.244*** 0.281*** 0.138***
DnMX1994 0.077* 0.078* 0.06 -0.053 -0.053
DnMX1995 0.294*** 0.297*** 0.333*** 0.083* 0.085*
DnMX1996 0.240*** 0.243*** 0.292*** 0.027 0.03
DnMX1997 0.115** 0.118** 0.162*** 0.007 0.011
DnMX1998 0.173*** 0.177*** 0.197*** 0.059 0.059
DnMX1999 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.180*** 0.042 0.033
DnMX2000 0.137** 0.140** 0.155*** 0.036 0.025
DnMX2001 0.186*** 0.189*** 0.211*** 0.133** 0.124**
DnMX2002 0.238*** 0.247*** 0.257*** 0.110*
DMnX1994 0.186*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.132*** 0.133***
DMnX1995 0.338*** 0.339*** 0.337*** 0.198*** 0.201***
DMnX1996 0.343*** 0.346*** 0.348*** 0.144*** 0.148***
DMnX1997 0.146*** 0.153*** 0.162*** 0.072** 0.076**
DMnX1998 0.193*** 0.202*** 0.203*** 0.140*** 0.140***
DMnX1999 0.169*** 0.178*** 0.194*** 0.116*** 0.116***
DMnX2000 0.075* 0.082* 0.097** 0.028 0.022
DMnX2001 0.081* 0.077* 0.102** 0.062 0.056
DMnX2002 0.163*** 0.161*** 0.177*** 0.092**
TariﬀsMXNafta -0.032* -0.127*** -0.099*** -0.101***
Exit in t+1 -0.811***
Plant Controls No No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Location FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 52621 52151 52151 37825 34634
r2 0.081 0.08 0.152 0.341 0.347
Note: The plants control include age, sales, capital per worker, R&D, payments for
technology transfers, foreign ownership
32Table 2: Controlling for Switchers
Eliminate ALWAYS switchers Eliminate switchers AFTER ﬁrst switch
OLS heckman heckman B OLS heckman heckman B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DMX -0.146*** -0.309*** -1.063*** -0.167*** -0.164*** -0.168***
DnMX 0.095 -0.633** -4.008*** -0.029 -0.030 -0.028
DMnX -0.007 -0.719*** -4.020*** -0.092*** -0.100*** -0.086***
DMX1994 0.242*** 0.227*** 0.155 0.189*** 0.230*** 0.162***
DMX1995 0.481*** 0.368*** -0.159 0.373*** 0.497*** 0.293***
DMX1996 0.385*** 0.218** -0.560 0.347*** 0.454*** 0.278***
DMX1997 0.219*** 0.004 -0.997** 0.198*** 0.280*** 0.145***
DMX1998 0.164*** 0.040 -0.536 0.171*** 0.187*** 0.161***
DMX1999 0.135*** -0.021 -0.746* 0.100*** 0.133*** 0.078*
DMX2000 0.026 -0.150 -0.973** 0.025 0.063 0.001
DMX2001 0.032 -0.071 -0.551 0.051 0.060 0.045
DnMX1994 0.133** 0.154 0.245 0.034 0.198*** -0.072
DnMX1995 0.438*** 0.393*** 0.185 0.239*** 0.452*** 0.102
DnMX1996 0.314*** 0.202 -0.319 0.177*** 0.372*** 0.051
DnMX1997 0.203** 0.104 -0.352 0.052 0.225*** -0.059
DnMX1998 0.371*** 0.339** 0.178 0.068 0.177** -0.002
DnMX1999 0.105 0.070 -0.097 0.012 0.142** -0.071
DnMX2000 0.115 0.126 0.172 0.004 0.110 -0.064
DnMX2001 0.208* 0.247 0.422 0.129** 0.227*** 0.067
3
3Eliminate ALWAYS switchers Eliminate switchers AFTER ﬁrst switch
OLS heckman heckman B OLS heckman heckman B
DMnX1994 0.266*** 0.264*** 0.253 0.181*** 0.291*** 0.110***
DMnX1995 0.465*** 0.584*** 1.134*** 0.267*** 0.316*** 0.235***
DMnX1996 0.269*** 0.412*** 1.075*** 0.234*** 0.363*** 0.151***
DMnX1997 0.146** 0.309*** 1.065** 0.049 0.173*** -0.031
DMnX1998 0.167*** 0.448*** 1.755*** 0.087** 0.151*** 0.045
DMnX1999 0.139* 0.389*** 1.553*** 0.041 0.147*** -0.028
DMnX2000 0.034 0.266** 1.341*** -0.017 0.126** -0.109**
DMnX2001 -0.002 0.258* 1.466*** 0.052 0.183*** -0.032
TariﬀsMXNafta -0.099*** -0.096*** -0.080 -0.102*** -0.103*** -0.101***
lambda 0.912*** 5.142*** -0.783*** 0.502***
FIRST STAGE - LHS: Firm is no Switcher ( = Firm Select into the sample)
Distance from average
productivity similar ﬁrms 0.042* 0.016 0.051** 0.008
Distance squared -0.010 -0.017**
Plant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 19,010 50,347 50,347 42,266 50,347 50,347
R2 0.411 0.392
Notes: The distance from average productivity of “similar” plants is in absolute value.
3
4